The concept of absent qualia is one of two major functionalist objections to the existence of

qualia In philosophy of mind, qualia ( or ; singular form: quale) are defined as individual instances of subjective, conscious experience. The term ''qualia'' derives from the Latin neuter plural form (''qualia'') of the Latin adjective '' quālis'' () ...

, the other being the

inverted spectrum The inverted spectrum is the hypothetical concept, pertaining to the philosophy of color, of two people sharing their color vocabulary and discriminations, although the colors one sees—one's qualia—are systematically different from the colors t ...

hypothesis. Qualia is a philosophical term used to refer to an individual's subjective experience, that is to say, the way something feels to that individual at that particular moment. The central tenet of functionalism is that

mental state A mental state, or a mental property, is a state of mind of a person. Mental states comprise a diverse class, including perception, pain experience, belief, desire, intention, emotion, and memory. There is controversy concerning the exact definiti ...

s (emotions, sensations, beliefs, etc.) are only a causal relationship between physical sensations, mental states (neurological states), and behavior. For example: John touches a hot stove, feels pain, and pulls back his hand. This is an example of a functionalist system. A functionalist would argue that attempting to insert the concept of qualia into this relationship creates an empty quality that has no actual physical relationship to anything. The "quale" in this example would be John's subjective sensation of his burned hand, how it feels to him at that moment to have a burned hand. The absent qualia hypothesis attempts to demonstrate why qualia such as this cannot exist. Michael Tye characterizes the absent qualia hypothesis as, "the hypothesis that it could be the case that a system that functionally duplicates the mental states of a normal human being has no

phenomenal A phenomenon ( : phenomena) is an observable event. The term came into its modern philosophical usage through Immanuel Kant, who contrasted it with the noumenon, which ''cannot'' be directly observed. Kant was heavily influenced by Gottfried W ...

consciousness (no qualia)." For example, if a machine, which could exactly duplicate the above scenario, was created and contained a computer system as complicated as John's neurological system, then it is logically possible that this system would have exactly the same reaction as John but lack consciousness, a prerequisite for subjective experience (qualia). A functionalist would argue that it must be the case that qualia would not be created in such a scenario, thus demonstrating that qualia cannot exist without conflicting with the fundamental tenets of Functionalism. The absent qualia argument is a direct challenge to the functionalist view of the mind that claims that mental states can be defined only in terms of their functional roles, without any reference to the specific physical properties of the brain. One of the main arguments against the absent qualia's point consists in denying the absence of qualia in non-human entities such as

Ned Block Ned Joel Block (born 1942) is an American philosopher working in philosophy of mind who has made important contributions to the understanding of consciousness and the philosophy of cognitive science. He has been professor of philosophy and psych ...

's robot. Some functionalists argue that the robot does have qualia because it is supposed to have all of the functions of the brain. They say that since the absent qualia argument is based on an inclination, it doesn't have any proof of the absence of qualia in the robot, or any other entities such as the United States of America. The absent qualia argument is often criticised due to its abstractility.

Examples

The zombie thought experiment is intended to challenge the functionalist view of the mind by highlighting the role of subjective experience in mental states. This experiment requires us to imagine a being that is functionally identical to a human being, in the sense that it behaves in exactly the same way as a human being and has the same mental states. However, unlike a human, it does not have any subjective experiences (qualia). This means that it is a being that behaves almost perfectly like a human, but lacks the subjective, qualitative character of conscious experience. The

China brain In the philosophy of mind, the China brain thought experiment (also known as the Chinese Nation or Chinese Gym) considers what would happen if each member of the Chinese nation were asked to simulate the action of one neuron in the brain, using ...

is another example and it states that if it were possible that we could take each and every single inhabitant of China and give them a two way radio so that they can communicate. That would in terms create an artificial brain, it's like having thousands of little men in your brain each signalling to each other. With this thought experiment, functionalism, which claims that mental states can be defined only in terms of their functional roles without any reference to the specific physical properties of the brain, is incomplete as a theory of the mind. However, this view fails to account for the fact that mental states are always accompanied by subjective experiences. If a being can have the same mental states as a human, but without the subjective experiences, then the functionalist view is incomplete, since it fails to capture an essential aspect of mental states.

References

{{Reflist Qualia

Examples

See also

References