17th Maine Volunteer Infantry Regiment

The 17th Maine Infantry Regiment was an infantry regiment that served in the Union Army during the American Civil War. It was particularly noted for its service during the 1863 Battle of Gettysburg.

Organization

The 17th Maine was organized at Camp King, Cape Elizabeth, Maine, it was mustered in for three years' service on August 18, 1862, and was mustered out on June 10, 1865. Recruits still liable to serve were transferred to 1st Maine Volunteer Heavy Artillery Regiment. The regiment was one of five raised in answer to the July 2, 1862, call by Lincoln for 300,000 volunteers for three years. The state of Maine's quota was 9,609.

The regiment was recruited in southern Maine from Androscoggin, Cumberland, Franklin, and York counties. As recruits entered training camp, the regiment quickly fleshed out to ten companies, A through K. Upon muster into federal service, each recruit received a federal bounty of $27.00.

Service

1862

After mustering in to federal service for three years, the 17th left State for Washington, D.C., Thursday, August 21, 1862 under the command of Colonel Thomas Roberts. Upon arrival in the capital, it manned fortifications around Washington during the Maryland Campaign. On Tuesday, October 7, 1862, it was sent to Upton's Hill where it joined McClellan's Army of the Potomac (AoP). It became a member of Maine native Berry's 3rd Brigade in Birney's 1st Division of Hooker's III Corps. The other regiments in the brigade were the 3rd and 5th Michigan; the 1st, 37th, and 101st New York. The other regiments were proven veterans. The 3rd Michigan had fought at First Bull Run. All of them had fought on the Peninsula and at Second Bull Run.

The 17th was joining a corps that had suffered heavily at Second Bull Run. It was so severely understrength that during the Maryland Campaign in September 1862, it had remained in Washington DC to rest and refit. The 17th was one of the units joining it to bring it up to strength. The 17th joined the army at Edward's Ferry on the Potomac in Poolesville, MD. While there, it found itself chronically short of rations and started foraging around local farms. This period at the ferry was spent drilling, as well as picketing, fatigue, and guard duty which included guarding a six-mile section of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal; this duty, although mounted in two-day stints, allowed the men to forage, in disobedience of orders, upon local secessionist farmers.

Having spent their initial service in the static defenses of Washington, the move from Maryland south was the 17th's first exposure to life with an army in the field. They soon learned from their veteran colleagues the various methods to supplement, substitute, or replace by living off the land. The presence of an army could destroy the future of any farm near even a one-night bivouac. The 17th proved apt pupils in the art of foraging. They quickly learned from other regiments the best areas to prowl.

Prelude to Fredericksburg

On October 27, the AoP began moving across the Potomac The operation took McClellan five days. Lee reacted by moving troops out of the Shenandoah to the south to avoid being flanked. Due to McClellan's slow pace, the Rebels managed to get ahead of the AoP. Once across the river, the 17th bivouacked near Leesburg. The army moved slowly west from Edwards Ferry to the foot of the Blue Ridge Mountains before heading southsouthwest between the Blue Ridge and Bull Run mountains. As the army moved south upon an axis of advance III Corps marched on the right flank of the army just east of the Blue Ridge Mountains. In this march, the 17th passed through the future battlefields of Upperville and Middleburg where their fellow Mainers, the 1st Maine Cavalry, would later see action.

As the army moved, they found the enemy had shifted its center of mass between them and Richmond such that they were soon a day ahead of the AoP on the move. The end target was soon identified as Warrenton where McClellan was planning to concentrate his army. An early blizzard arrived on the night of Thursday, November 6, continuing into the next day giving the men of the regiment a taste of home. On Friday evening, November 7, McClellan was relieved and replaced by Maj. Gen. Burnside as the army commander. Despite his lack of success in battle, McClellan had succeeded in building an army and was popular with the men for it. The army as a whole was not pleased with his relief, and the 17th despite their short tenure in the field and lack of combat experience, adopted this resentment.

A reluctant army commander, Burnside immediately received pressure from Lincoln to take aggressive action. In response to prodding from Lincoln and general-in-chief Maj. Gen. Halleck, Burnside planned a late fall offensive that the relied on quick movement and deception. Concentrating his army in a visible fashion near Warrenton, feigning a movement on Culpeper Court House, Orange Court House or Gordonsville, he would then rapidly shift southeast and cross the Rappahannock River to Fredericksburg, hoping to steal a march on Lee. The AoP would then move rapidly south along the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad (RF&P) against Richmond. He chose this course lest he strike directly south from Warrenton, exposed to a flanking attack from LTGEN Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley and because he felt the Orange and Alexandria Railroad (O&A) would be inadequate for logistics as well as the fact that Lee had blocked the O&A.

The 17th were afforded a closer view of life in Virginia in comparison to their home state and were unimpressed. As well as slavery's racial divisions, the men noted with dislike the rigid class division among the white population. The 17th Maine due to its inexperience did not realize how destructive the first eighteen months of the war had already been on the local environment, greatly adding to the dreariness they duly noted.

While Burnside began assembling a supply base at Falmouth, Washington reviewed the plan. Lincoln, correctly, saw the main goal was the destruction of Lee and his army and not Richmond, but despite this when Burnside presented his plan on Thursday, November 14, Lincoln reluctantly approved it. Halleck wired Burnside, "The President has just assented to your plan," adding for emphasis: "He thinks that it will succeed if you move rapidly; otherwise not."

Burnside saw rapid movement could catch Lee off guard and make a river crossing possible before Lee could concentrate his forces to contest it. The Rappahannock, rises in the mountains as a stream until Warrenton, where several tributaries swell it into a river. At Fredericksburg, it is quite deep below the falls and can be crossed only by bridges. Opposite the northern end of Fredericksburg was a smaller town, Falmouth. They were both mill towns that had prospered grounding the local grains into flour. Powered by canals as well as the river, the mills tapped the river above the dam. In the antebellum era, bridges had connected the two towns but they had been destroyed during Johnston's withdrawal a year before. Any crossing would need to be done at a ford or with pontoon bridges. The AoP had experienced engineers well-practiced in assembling pontoons and manipulating canals for various purposes.

Burnside went into action immediately. On Saturday, November 15, he began to pull his army out of the Warrenton, Virginia area and head southeast towards Fredericksburg. That morning, AoP artillery roused the Confederates. IX Corps struck the Rappahannock River at Warrenton Springs, and I Corps demonstrated focusing on Freeman's and Beverly's fords to the east. Cavalry and infantry attacked Rebels at Rappahannock Station and captured the bridge there intact. The sudden action on a wide front surprised Lee who pulled back from in front of the AoP. Unsure of the Federals’ destination, Lee held back and sent an infantry regiment and an artillery battery to strengthen Fredericksburg. If Burnside had already crossed and occupied Fredericksburg, Lee would withdraw to North Anna River. Anticipating that the town could not be held, Lee got permission to destroy the railroad between Fredericksburg and Hanover Junction. Lee thought it likely that Burnside would transfer his army south of the James River.

Burnside had moved rapidly that weekend without Lee discovering his intent. On Sunday evening, when he heard Sumner’s men were approaching Falmouth, Lee immediately had Longstreet send two of his divisions toward Fredericksburg. As these units left their camps the next morning, Monday, November 18, Stuart’s scouts forded the Rappahannock arriving at Warrenton just as the last U.S. troops were departing. In the meantime, when the AoP started from Warrenton, Sumner's grand division led the way, arriving on Sunday evening, 17 November, opposite the upper edge of Fredericksburg; Burnside had fooled Lee and made it opposite Fredericksburg almost undetected. Next, he needed to get the army across the Rappahannock and push on to Richmond.

When Sumner arrived at Falmouth, Fredericksburg was occupied by only a small force. As soon as the Union troops appeared on the Stafford Heights, an artillery duel began. The Rebels were soon driven from the guns. Standing unmanned, the Rebel guns tempted Sumner to cross the river and capture them. Lest he incur Burnside's wrath, Sumner would not permit volunteers to go over and get them, but he did ask permission to take Fredericksburg, if he (Sumner) could find a crossing. Burnside turned him down as he felt it unwise to take Fredericksburg before he had fully established his communications. He was also concerned that the increasing autumn rains would make the fording points unusable and that Sumner might be cut off and destroyed. He ordered Sumner to wait in Falmouth ending the matter, and the troops went into camp waiting for orders.

The 17th, as part of III Corps waited in Warrenton until Monday, November 17, when they stepped out at 7:30 a.m. to join the rest of the army massing at Falmouth. Traveling for four days in cold rain and mud, they received orders for Falmouth, arriving there Saturday, November 22. While the army waited for bridging equipment, it remained across the river from the Rebels. In the meantime, General Hooker had been promoted to the command of the Center Grand Division, composed of the III and V Corps; General George Stoneman had been assigned to the command of the III Corps; General Birney to that of the 1st Division; General Daniel E. Sickles to the 2nd Division; and a third division of only two brigades (including the corps' three nine-month regiments) under General Amiel W. Whipple had been added.

Battle of Fredericksburg

The 17th fought its first battle at Fredericksburg December 11–15. It waited with the rest of the army on the eastern bank of Rappahannock from December 11–13. The men were awakened before dawn on Thursday by the army's nearly 200 guns opening a bombardment of the town of Fredericksburg. Throughout The regiment was marched to the riverbank to Brooks Farm where they remained that day as spectators to the beginning of the battle. On Friday, 12 December, the 17th and its division were held in reserve and moved to woods on the eastern bank of the river south of the town. From there the men of the regiment continued their observations of the fighting in the town and the movement of the other troops in the army across the pontoon bridges at the north and south ends of the town as well as the pontoon bridge further downstream, just below the Deep Run outlet into the Rappahannock. Birney's 1st Division remained under arms throughout Friday, the suspense and anticipation wearing on the men of the 17th. Birney's Division was kept in the woods throughout Friday to hide it from Rebel observers, but the men were allowed to make small fires for food and warmth.

On Saturday, December 13, Birney received orders to cross the river, but instead of joining III Corps in the Center Grand Division, the division was going to reinforce Major Gen. Franklin's Left Grand Division who had been rebuffed by Jackson's Corps in their assaults on Prospect Hill. As the regiment emerged from the woods, they were surprised to see across the river, four lines of troops in this grand division lying flat on the ground while a much smaller force assaulted Prospect Hill.

After double-timing for a mile over thawing, muddy ground, at noon Saturday, the 17th Maine crossed the river on Franklin's pontoon bridge south and downstream of Fredericksburg. Once across, it took up position in the fields southwest of Fredericksburg. It moved into line behind Major Gen. Meade's 3rd Division of Pennsylvanians and right of Major Gen. Doubleday's 1st Division of Major Gen. John F. Reynolds's I Corps who were under attack in their position along the Richmond Stage Road. Berry ordered Col. Roberts to advance, and the 17th moved forward without dropping their knapsacks as Meade's withdrawing men passed through their lines after a failed attempt to take the hill. Just as the 17th arrived at the crest of a slight rise between the river and the dip through which the tracks of the Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac Railroad (RF&P) ran, Rebels were emerged from the woods in pursuit of Meade's retreating men. The 17th was quickly ordered forward, and told to lie down and commence firing. The fire from the regiment was sufficient to repel the Rebels.

Throughout afternoon, the 17th and its brigade and division helped repulse several assaults by Jackson's Corps. The 17th spent most of their time on line laying prone slightly forward of some batteries to minimize casualties from the Rebels' foot and horse artillery on Prospect Hill and on their extreme left. Jackson's troops made several assaults across the RF&P tracks ran. The field in which the 17th lay was newly plowed and muddy which aided in protection from cannonballs. The 17th Maine and its brigade drove off several attempts to take the battery, while Brig. Gen Ward's 2nd Brigade on its right was heavily engaged helping Meade's 3rd Division repel A.P. Hill division. By nightfall on Saturday, movement across the small valley had ceased but gun and artillery fire continued.

During the night, the men of the 17th heard the cries and moans of the wounded lying in the valley by the RF&P tracks between the two armies. On Sunday, a truce went into effect to recover the wounded and bury the dead. On Sunday night, the Rebel skirmishers trying to find the U.S. Army's position were driven off before midnight, and through the night and early morning, the men of the regiment could hear the Confederates repairing and strengthening their lines.

While not involved in the bloody assaults on Marye's Heights, it was in combat suffering two men killed and nineteen wounded. Its performance was complimented by Gen. Berry for steadiness of the men under fire for the first time. III Corps, as a whole had not been prominently engaged at Fredericksburg, although under a heavy fire in the town; still, its casualties amounted to 145 killed, 837 wounded, and 202 missing; total 1,184, over half of which occurred south of town in the fields in Ward's 2nd Brigade in the 17th Maine's division.

Monday saw the armies sitting still and watching each other across the battlefield. The 17th Maine remained in its lines, but received a welcome mail call that day. It remained in position across the river until Tuesday night at 10:00 p.m. December 16. Having stacked arms, but remaining ready, the army began its withdrawal back across the Rappahannock. Under strictly enforced noise discipline, the 17th Maine and its division slipped back across the river at midnight on the pontoon bridges and went into winter encampment at Falmouth.

1863

In the new year the 17th remained in the winter encampment until the army began its infamous " Mud March" on Tuesday, January 20, 1863. The regiment slogged through torrential rains up and down the east side of the Rappahannock to the jeers of Rebels across the river. The 17th found the movement stymied by the mud and nearly constant rain. After much futile marching in the sodden terrain, the regiment and the army returned to their encampment, Camp Sickles, at Falmouth, on Friday, January 23. The regiment and others in the army were quite demoralized by the experience.

The men of the regiment found that after their return, they needed to rebuild their huts. They also were greeted by the paymaster who paid them for the first time since they had left Maine. To add to their low morale, they only received pay up to October 31. The men were further disheartened when, flush with cash, the suttler's prices had risen dramatically The scarcity and irregularity of the delivery of government rations made the purchase of food from these merchants a necessity and added to the regiment's, and army's discontent.

The next Monday, January 26, saw their former corps commander, Joseph Hooker relieve Burnside and take command of the army. One of the first changes he introduced was to increase the quantity, quality, and frequency of issuing rations which had an immediate beneficial result on the regiment's mood. The army found their prospects growing brighter with some of the organizational changes Hooker made including the use of corps badges across the army. Hooker had the army improve conditions in the camp including building large bakeries to provide daily bread to the troops. An increase in drilling, inspections, and reviews had a positive effect. Morale rose as the regiment drilled and prepared for the upcoming Chancellorsville Campaign. The 17th also regularly took target practice and held marksmanship competitions.

The 17th took its turn in the rotations of picket duty between the long periods of drill. Manning lines along the Rappahannock led to frequent interactions with Rebel pickets across the river. Through time on picket and in camp, the men took note of many things. They found the local white population were the poor who had no means to leave like their wealthier neighbors but were secessionist in politics. They noted frequent ascents in the observation balloons by staff officers to observe the Rebels. Finally, they realized the scarcity of wood in the surrounding environment caused by the army's fuel requirements for cooking and heating as well as the negative affect the deforestation would have come warmer, drier weather.

At the beginning of April, Hooker shifted his army around to new locations that had ample supplies of wood and water while still remaining intact. The 17th shifted its location three miles south to Belle Plain plantation where it occupied two hill tops, officers on one and men on the other. The whole army was under orders to keep five days' worth of rations in their knapsacks and haversacks to be ready to move at a moment's notice; daily rations were issued so that the men need not dip into this supply. Hooker's promotion brought a non-West Pointer, the New York politician, Daniel Sickles to command III Corps. In turn, their brigade commander, Berry, replaced Sickles in command of the corps' 3rd Division. In turn, Samuel B. Hayman, of the 37th New York took command of the brigade which remained in Birney's 1st Division.

Chancellorsville campaign

In Hooker's original plans, III Corps was to be part of the force under Sedgwick attacking from the south at Fredericksburg. On the afternoon of April 28, the 17th in its brigade moved down to the banks of the Rappahannock very near where it was staged prior to its crossing in December. On Wednesday, the 17th's brigade, as in December, was moved into the woods to keep it out of Rebel sight. The regiment remained there watching two balloons of the Union Army Balloon Corps (attached by that time to the Engineer Brigade under Captain Cyrus B. Comstock).

On Thursday, the regiment was assembled and read an order from Hooker announcing the establishment of his headquarters at Chancellorsville, which was little more than a single large, brick mansion at the junction of the Orange Turnpike and Orange Plank Road. Unbeknownst to the men of the regiment, Hooker had decided to pull III Corps to reinforce his right up at Chancellorsville. After the announcement, at 4 p.m., the 17th and II Corps marched north along the Rappahannock for fifteen miles. They arrived near United States Ford at 1 a.m., and promptly fell asleep on the wet ground.

On Friday, May 1, the 17th Maine crossed the Rappahannock and Rapidan rivers. They were aiming for the crossroads at Chancellorsville. Just over the Rapidan, the men started seeing wounded passing to the rear and heard the sound of battle ahead. Arriving on May 1, the regiment formed in battle line with the rest of III Corps along the Plank Road. Initially, to leave the plank road clear for ambulances, the corps pushed forward of the road into the fields that were higher than the road south of it. Almost at once Rebel artillery opened up on the troops. Sickles immediately recalled his line to shelter in the embankment of the road.

Before III Corps' arrival that day, at 11:30 a.m., initial contact had been made when Sykes' V Corps and Slocums XII Corps had run into the enemy on Orange turnpike and Orange Plank Road respectively, eastsoutheast of Chancellorsville crossroads. Upon contact, despite outnumbering his opponent, Hooker had abandoned his plan to attack and pulled his forces back to dig in.

=The Push South

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On May 2, as III Corps manned their defensive lines, Sickles pushed the 1st division forward to Hazel Grove, high ground a short distance in front of his line. At 8 a.m., members of the 1st Division at Hazel Grove saw Rebels a mile and a quarter away on high ground around Catharine Furnace through a gap in the woods. Observers went up into the tops of the trees to get a better look and confirmed the movement. The division's three batteries soon opened fire. At 9 a.m., Sickles had reported back to Hooker of the Southerners moving steadily past the open space and requested permission to attack.

When Hooker received the report about the Confederate movement, he thought that Lee might be starting a retreat, but he also realized that a flanking march might be in progress. He took two actions. First, he sent a message at 9:30 a.m. to the commander of the XI Corps, Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard on his right flank: "We have good reason to suppose the enemy is moving to our right. Please advance your pickets for purposes of observation as far as may be safe in order to obtain timely information of their approach." At 10:50 a.m., Howard replied that he was "taking measures to resist an attack from the west." Hooker's second action was to send orders to Sedgwick – "attack the enemy in his front" at Fredericksburg if "an opportunity presents itself with a reasonable expectation of success" – and Sickles – "advance cautiously toward the road followed by the enemy, and harass the movement as much as possible". Sedgwick did not take action from the discretionary orders. Sickles, however, was enthusiastic when he received the order at noon. He sent Birney's division, flanked by two battalions of Col. Hiram Berdan's U.S. sharpshooters, south from Hazel Grove to Catharine Furnace with orders to pierce the column and gain possession of the road.

The regiment's initial movement in the attack was hindered by one of the supporting batteries cutting the regiment's column in two. After much arguing, the regiment was able to regroup and advance south. Their division, Birney's, moved south down Furnace Road and the thick forest on either side. The Maine soldiers noted Berdan's men slipping through the heavy undergrowth on the flanks of the column. Just south of the furnace, the column made contact with the enemy.

The attack came too late to deliver a blow to Jackson's force. The 3rd Brigade, including the 17th, which found the rearguard of Jackson's column. This action elicited a "brisk shelling by the enemy." This rearguard was the 23rd Georgia Infantry who resisted the advance of Birney and Berdan at Catherine Furnace. The Georgians were driven south and made a stand at the same unfinished railroad bed used by Wright's Brigade the day before. They were overwhelmed by 5 p.m. and most were captured. Two brigades from A.P. Hill's division turned back from the flanking march and prevented any further damage to Jackson's column, which by now had left the area. In this action out in front of the main Federal lines, the 17th had a few men wounded.

As the remainder of the enemy stiffened preventing further advance, the men of the regiment along with their division were now about two miles south of the Orange Plank Road with their right flank unguarded. The division withdrew a short distance expecting to bivouac there for the night. The men felt they had done well, driving the enemy and capturing the 23rd Georgia and its colors.

Hooker had misread the situation and thought that Jackson and the rest of the Army of Northern Virginia was in retreat towards Richmond. Most of Jackson's men were unaware of the small action at the rear of their column. As they marched north on Brock Road, Jackson was prepared to turn right on the Orange Plank Road, from which his men would attack the Union lines at around Wilderness Church. However, it became apparent that this direction would lead to essentially a frontal assault against Howard's line. Fitzhugh Lee met Jackson, and they ascended a hill with a sweeping view of the Union position. Jackson saw XI Corps resting, unaware of the impending Confederate threat.

=Jackson's attack

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At 5:30 p.m., Jackson caved in XI Corps and routed it. The reconnaissance had drawn the 17th and its corps further away from XI on their right. In response, Sickle's pulled Birney and the rest of his corps back to Hazel Grove, yet still in advance of the Plank Road. Hazel Grove was a strong position that Lee needed to possess to link up with Jackson. After much hard fighting, the U.S. forces had stabilized such that the Army of the Potomac lay between Jackson to the west and Lee to the east.

Sickles, unsure whether to conform to the retreat to the other side of the crossroads or hold his strong position in Hazel Grove, had last heard from Hooker before the collapse on the right, about 5 p.m. He sent his assistant adjutant-general, with a small mounted escort to reopen communications. This party returned with orders for Sickles to hold Hazel Grove. He sent them back to tell Hooker that a portion of Whipple's 3rd Division's ammunition (mule) train, some of the caissons of his batteries, and two or three of his cannon were in the woods occupied by the enemy, between III Corps and the Plank Road. Sickles wanted to recover these, as well as the line of the Plank Road with a night attack, if supported by the line of Williams' and Berry's divisions. The men of the 17th bivouacked in a field on the slope facing the Confederates just westnorthwest of the grove.

Meanwhile, remnants of the XI Corps and Couch's II Corps began a push west along Orange turnpike to come up on Sicle's right flank. During this attack they were rebuffed by Lane's brigade in Hill's Division. Jackson, however, was badly wounded in a friendly fire incident in the shadows of the woods on the clear night with a full moon. Men of the 33rd North Carolina thinking the oncoming horsemen shadows of horsemen galloping in their direction to avoid fire from the Federal attack thought they were attacking U. S. Army cavalry and opened fire. Command of the Second Corps fell to Maj. Gen. A.P. Hill who himself was soon wounded. Hill consulted with Brig. Gen. Robert E. Rodes, the next most senior in the corps, and Rodes acquiesced in Hill's decision to summon the cavalry commander Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart to take command, notifying Lee and Jackson after the fact.

=Sickles' attack

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To make ready for his attack if Hooker agreed, Sickles made III Corps ready. After dusk, on the night of May 2, the 17th Maine was temporarily placed under command of Gen. Ward's 2nd brigade along with the 63rd Pennsylvania from the 1st Brigade, and assigned to a column under command of Col. Egan, 40th New York Volunteers, detailed for the night attack to regain the munitions and guns as well as the position along the Plank Road lost during the afternoon. Sickles expected Berry's 1st Division and Williams' 1st Division, XII Corps to support Birney on his right, but they never received word of the planned attack. Sickles soon received approval his night attack, and ordered Birney to advance. Birney 's 2nd (Ward's) and 3rd brigades s were formed one in rear of the other, or in two echelons. In the first line of the first echelon were the six regiments of the 2d brigade, except the 20th Indiana, which had not yet returned from its position south of the railroad cut. Egan's column formed at 9  p.m. and proceeded, the 40th New York being in the advance. The 17th and the 63rd Pennsylvania followed the 40th into the darkness caused by the dense woods on the narrow lane, running north through the thick woods from Hazel Grove to the Old Schoolhouse Orange Turnpike/Orange Plank Road, in column by company. The column advanced on the road and the open space on each side of it (known locally as the Vista). The other regiments in the first echelon (2nd brigade) formed a line of companies at deploying intervals, each company in column of fours as they advanced through the undergrowth. The second echelon, consisting of the four remaining regiments of the 3rd brigade was about 100 yards in rear of the first, and , also in company columns of fours at deploying intervals. As the lines advanced by the light of the moon, all were under orders, with bayonets fixed and pieces uncapped, with orders not to fire until the Plank Road and Slocum's Log Works were reached.

There were no skirmishers or ground scouts in advance, and the enemy's position had not been located. All the officers on the road and in the woods had dismounted and continued on foot as there was not enough road for the horses and riding through the woods was impracticable. The column on the road had to change from column of companies upon reaching the end of the Vista, into a column of fours. The force had advanced only a short distance when it made contact and received a very brisk fire from the enemy. Alongside the infantry, Rebel artillery sent shells into the woods. As well, companies on the right of the attack ran into XII Corps units pushing west against Trimble's Division . The force found that the Confederates were using breastworks that the XI Corps had built earlier that day and added an abattis in front of the works.

The fire was heavy on the federal forces in the woods, but overwhelming on the column in the road who were clear of any obstructions to the Rebels' fire save the darkness. Confused soldiers in the column disobeyed orders and loaded and discharged their weapons in the direction of the enemy, but inadvertently fired into the rear of the companies ahead of them. Fire from both sides sent the 40th New York companies at the head of the column running through the lines of the 17th causing confusion and disorder. All but the last two companies in the column broke. These two companies stood firm and formed the foundation around which the column recovered, and formed a line of battle.

The column formed its line parallel to the road and fired northwest and north into the woods with the 63rd Pennsylvania on its right and the 40th returning to the left flank. The 17th Maine opened a heavy fire on the Rebels. By 2 a.m., on May 3, however, lacking the expected support from Berry and Williams, Birney found he was unable to hold his position in the woods south of the road. He withdrew his command, and the 17th returned to its bivouac by Hazel Grove. The fire from the Rebels prevented them from recovering their dead and wounded from the woods and the road. In this fight, the regiment lost one man killed, seven wounded, and eighteen missing in the night.

In this action, the men of the 17th managed to recover one brass cannon and four rifled guns that had been taken by the Confederates during the afternoon. The five pieces were drawn back and delivered to Capt. Randolph, by a detachment of the 17th. Gen. Ward highly complimented the 17th regiment in this affair, as shown by extract from his official report.

=Rebel assaults

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Early on May 3, Hooker actually saved Lee a bloody assault when he ordered Sickles to fall back to the Plank Road. Stuart seized the departure of the 17th and III Corps from Hazel Grove and quickly placed artillery in III Corps' former strong position. Beginning about 5:30 a.m. supported by the newly installed artillery at Hazel Grove, Stuart launched a series of assaults on the U. S. Army positions around the crossroads. Fierce resistance by III, XII, and II Corp behind strong earthworks led to the heaviest of the campaign, and the 17th Maine was in the thick of it.

The 17th rejoined its brigade and spent the early morning in supporting batteries on Fairview Hill. Unfortunately for the men of the 17th and their comrades, Confederate guns on Hazel Grove were joined by 20 more on the Plank Road. to duel effectively with the U. S. guns on neighboring Fairview Hill, causing the Federals to withdraw as ammunition ran low and Confederate infantrymen picked off the gun crews. Being exposed to this heavy crossfire of artillery and musketry caused the men of the 17th great suffering. The regiment, in position to repel an attack on the hill, gave time for the removal of the artillery.

Fairview was evacuated at 9:30 a.m., briefly recaptured in a counterattack, but by 10 a.m. Hooker ordered it abandoned for good. The loss of this artillery platform doomed the Union position at the Chancellorsville crossroads as well, and the Army of the Potomac began a fighting retreat to positions circling United States Ford. The soldiers of the two halves of Lee's army reunited shortly after 10 a.m. But the regiment retired with the brigade and went to the support of the batteries in the Army of the Potomac's center.

On the evening of May 3 and all-day May 4, Hooker remained in his defenses north of Chancellorsville. When Lee saw that Hooker was threatening no offensive action, he turned on Sedgwick's troops to the east. By this time Sedgwick had placed his divisions into a strong defensive position with its flanks anchored on the Rappahannock, three sides of a rectangle extending south of the Plank Road. The Rebels reoccupied Marye's Heights on the morning of May 4, cutting Sedgwick off from the town. Lee attacked him around 6 p.m pushing back Sedgwick's left-center across the Plank Road. Throughout the day on May 4, Hooker provided no assistance or useful guidance to Sedgwick. Outnumbered, Sedgwick withdrew across the Rappahannock at Banks's Ford during the pre-dawn hours of May 5. When he learned that Sedgwick had retreated back over the river, Hooker felt he was out of options to save the campaign, and on the night of May 5–6, the army withdrew back across the river at U.S. Ford. On May 5, Col. Roberts returned and assumed command, and early on the 6th, the 17th Maine withdrew across the river without any loss of men, and returned to its camp at Falmouth near Potomac Creek.

=Aftermath

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The 17th Maine had fought hard and well, but at a cost. It suffered 113 men killed, wounded, and missing out of about 625 in action. Upon the regiment's return to Camp Sickles, on Wednesday, May 6, Colonel Roberts resigned command due to illness. Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. Merrill stepped up to command the regiment.

Gettysburg campaign

The 17th Maine, its brigade, division, and corps had significant losses at Chancellorsville; the regiment lost a little under a fifth and the corps overall about a quarter. The depleted ranks were still further lessened by the loss of four New York regiments whose two years term of enlistment had expired (including the 17th's brigademates, the 1st and 37th New York); in addition, the division of nine month troops had gone home. The corps was accordingly consolidated into two divisions; the 1st under General David B. Birney, and the 2nd under General Andrew A. Humphreys, an able officer who had distinguished himself as a division commander at Fredericksburg. The time after Chancellorsville was spent rearming and resupplying.

With the loss of the two New York two-year regiments, the reorganization gave the 3rd brigade the 110th Pennsylvania from the 2nd Brigade of Whipple's 3rd Division (no longer in existence) and the 40th New York as an intra-division transfer from the 2nd Brigade (of note, III Corps 2nd division also had the 1st and 2nd United States Sharpshooters assigned to it). While smaller, II Corps had veteran units. One of the commanders of a departing New York two-year militia regiment, Col P. Régis de Trobriand, extended his service and took over command of the brigade.

On Thursday, June 11, the 17th was alerted to prepare to move. Hooker had received reports of Confederate infantry on the other side of the Blue Ridge Mountains but believed Lee had slipped northwest along the Rappahannock.
On Friday morning, the regiment was on the march to the northwest. Despite the warm weather and dusty roads, there was very little straggling, and after fifteen miles, at 10:30 p.m., it bivouacked near Hartwood Church. Resuming the march Saturday morning at 8:00 a.m., it made a rigorous twenty-two-mile march to Bealton Station, on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. This leg of their journey, conducted during the high June heat of the day over very dusty roads, exhausted the troops who nevertheless were in readiness to march at 4:00 a.m. on Sunday, June 14th. Luckily for the regiment, they were able to recoup during the day because the order to move did not arrive until 6:00 p.m. A six-hour march via Licking Creek and Warrenton Junction to Catlett's Station, where they stopped at midnight. Despite the more productive marching in the evening the following morning saw the march take place during the high heat and humidity of midday. Before nightfall over 8,000 men of III Corps fell behind the column, and many died from sunstroke.

III Corps arrived near Manassas Junction at 5:00 p.m. The Army of the Potomac remained in that vicinity for a little over a week while Hooker sent his cavalry to try to pierce the Confederate cavalry screen to locate Lee’s army, leading three minor cavalry battles from June 17 through June 21 in the Loudoun Valley
The 17th and its companions in the army spent their time near Manassas and then slightly northwest at Gum Springs drilling and re-equipping.

Hooker was surprised on Thursday, June 25, when he learned that Lee had crossed the Potomac River. In response, he got his army moving into Maryland. The 17th would march to Frederick with the army to concentrate there, except for Slocum's XII Corps who went to Middletown.

Affiliations, battle honors, detailed service, and casualties

Organizational affiliation

Attached to:
* Defences of Washington to October, 1862
* 3rd Brigade, 1st Division, III Corps, Army of the Potomac, to March, 1864
* 2nd Brigade, 3rd Division, II Corps, to June, 1864.
* 1st Brigade, 3rd Division, II Corps, to March, 1865. 2nd Brigade, 3rd Division, II Corps, to June, 1865.

List of battles

The official list of battles in which the regiment bore a part:
* Battle of Fredericksburg
* Battle of Chancellorsville
* Battle of Gettysburg
* Battle of Wapping Heights
* Bristoe Campaign
* First Battle of Auburn
* Battle of Bristoe Station
* Mine Run Campaign
* Battle of Mine Run
* Battle of the Wilderness
* Battle of Spotsylvania
* Battle of Cold Harbor
* Siege of Petersburg
* Appomattox Campaign

Detailed service

1862

* Left State for Washington, D.C., August 21
* Attached to Defenses of Washington to October 7, 1862.
* At Upton's Hill, Va., until October 12
* Edwards Ferry October 12–28.
* Advance to Warrenton, thence to Falmouth, Va., October 28 – November 22
* Battle of Fredericksburg December 12–15
** Eastern Bank of Rappahannock December 12–13
** Fields southwest of Fredericksburg December 13–15
* To winter encampment, Falmouth, Va., December 16

1863

* Falmouth, VA
* " Mud March" January 20–24
* Back to encampment, Camp Sickles, Falmouth, January 25
* Chancellorsville Campaign April 27 – May 6
** Battle of Chancellorsville May 1–5
* Return to Camp Sickles, May 6
* Gettysburg Campaign June 13 – July 24
** To Manassas. June 11–16
** Centerville, June 17–25
** Edward's Ferry, June 26
** To Middletown, Maryland, June 28
** To Frederick, Maryland, June 28
** To Taneytown, Maryland June 29
** T0 Emmetsburg, June 30
** To Gettysburg, July 1
** Battle of Gettysburg July 2–3
** Battle of Wapping Heights July 23
* To Sulphur Springs encampment, July 25
* To Brandy Station September 15
* Bristoe Campaign October 9–22
** First Battle of Auburn, October 13
** Second Battle of Auburn, October 14
** Battle of Bristoe Station, October 14
* Advance to line of the Rappahannock November 7–8
* Kelly's Ford November 7
* Mine Run Campaign November 26 – December 2
** Battle of Payne's Farm November 27
** Battle of Mine Run November 28–30

1864

* Demonstration on the Rapidan February 6–7.
* Overland Campaign May 3 – June 15. — ''Broke camp under command Colonel West, 21 commissioned officers, 5 acting officers, and 439 enlisted men.''
** Battle of the Wilderness May 5–7. — ''Commanded by West/Walker/Moore. Attached to Hays'/Crocker's 2nd Brigade, Birney's 3rd Division, Hancock's II Corps, Meade's Army of Potomac. Set up entrenchments May 5 along Brock Road. May 6, drove enemy from Brock one mile, and retreated unmolested to Brock Road works. Repulsed several unsuccessful assaults by Longstreet's Corps. Heavy fighting along fortifications set brush on fire. Lost 24 men killed, 147 wounded and 12 missing.''
** Laurel Hill May 8.
** Spotsylvania May 8–9
** Skirmishing on Po River May 10. — ''Lost 10 wounded 2 missing.''
** Battle of Spotsylvania Court House May 11–21, — ''Attached to Crocker's/Egan's 2nd Brigade, Birney's 3rd Division, Hancock's II Corps, Meade's Army of Potomac.''
*** Skirmishing between Po and Brock Road, May 11 — ''While erecting works, lost 2 wounded''
*** "Bloody Angle," Assault on the Salient, May 12. — ''With Corps, stealthily pulled at night from Union right wing to pass behind and to woods at left end of the line. At daybreak from these woods assaulted, captured, and held breast works. Sergeant Frank Haskell and Private John F Totman captured defending Confederate division commander, Edward Johnson (general). Lost 3 killed, 41 wounded, and 10 missing.''
*** ''Lieutenant Colonel Merrill returned from Maine, relieved Major Moore, and took command''
*** Harris Farm, Fredericksburg Road, May 19.
** Battle of North Anna May 23–26. — ''Attacked, took, and held rebel positions to south and west overlooking North Anna river. Lost 4 killed and 17 wounded.''
** Line of the Pamunkey May 26–28.
** Totopotomoy May 28–31.
** Battle of Cold Harbor June 1–12. — ''Attached to Egan's 1st Brigade, Birney's 3rd Division, Hancock's II Corps, Meade's Army of Potomac. Birney's Division anchored right wing of army. Lost 23 men.On June 4, gained 129 men transferred from 3rd Maine whose enlistment still remained. In works skirmishing until 21:00, May 12 when repeating Spotsylvania move, shifted behind center and left of Army of Potomac, quietly took positions in the moonlight at new left wing.''
** Wilcox Landing, June 14
** Before Petersburg June 16–19.
* Siege of Petersburg June 16, 1864, to April 2, 1865. — ''Lost 84 men''
** Second Battle of Petersburg June 15–18 — ''Commanded by Captain John C. Perry/Captain Benjamin C. Pennell/Major Erasmus C. Gilbreath (of the 20th IN). Attached to Egan's/Madill's 1st Brigade, Birney's/Mott's 3rd Division, Birney's/Hancock's II Corps, Meade's Army of Potomac. Made two unsuccessful assaults on Confederate entrenchments on June 16. On June 17 occupied the same works which had been captured the night before. On June 18, advanced and took defenses from enemy again. Lost 10 Killed, 46 wounded, and 9 missing.''
** Battle of Jerusalem Plank Road June 22–23. — ''Commanded by Gilbreath. Attached to de Trobriand's 1st Brigade, Mott's 3rd Division, Hancock's II Corps, Meade's Army of Potomac. Occupied second line during June 22 and watched Mahone's attack stall at first line as well as 2nd brigade's unsuccessful attack to recapture first line. Attacked and retook front line morning June 23, which had been abandoned early morning by rebels.''
** Fatigue duty dismantling rebel fortifications, extending Union entrenchments, July 4–26
** First Battle of Deep Bottom, north of the James, July 27–28. — ''Commanded by Gilbreath. Attached to de Trobriand's 1st Brigade, Mott's 3rd Division, Hancock's II Corps, Meade's Army of Potomac. Held in reserve for Mott's 3rd Division. Deployed as skirmishers to protect right flank to Bailey's Run.''
** Battle of the Crater July 30. — Commanded by Gilbreath. Attached to de Trobriand's 1st Brigade, Mott's 3rd Division, Hancock's II Corps, Meade's Army of Potomac. Held in trenches byu brigade commander when intel reported opposite works fully manned. Lieutenant Colonel Merrill takes command July 31.''
** Second Battle of Deep Bottom August 13–20. — ''Commanded by Merrill. Attached to de Trobriand's 1st Brigade, Mott's 3rd Division, Hancock's II Corps, Meade's Army of Potomac. Embarked on steamers to make show of sailing away, but returned under nightfall to Deep Bottom.''
*** Strawberry Plains August 14–18. — ''Enemy taken by surprise and driven from positions. Captured coastal defense batteries. Kept up constant harassing fore from skirmishers to pin down rebel forces.''
** Second Battle of Ream's Station August 25. — ''Brigade under arms as Corps reserve''
** In entrenchments to the right of Fort Sedgewick, August 29 – September 28
** Poplar Springs Church September 29 – October 2.
** Colonel West returns and takes command October 12.
** Battle of Boydton Plank Road October 27–28. — ''Commanded by West/Captain William Hobson. Attached to de Trobriand's 1st Brigade, Mott's 3rd Division, Hancock's II Corps, Meade's Army of Potomac. Repulsed breakthrough on Egan's division October 27. Colonel West wounded again. Entrenched and held off Hampton's division on October 28. ''
** Garrison at Fort Rice October 30 – November 29
** To left flank at James River, November 30 – December 6
** Raid on Weldon Railroad December 7–11. — ''Commanded by Hobson. Attached to de Trobriand's 1st Brigade, Mott's 3rd Division, Warren's V Corps, Meade's Army of Potomac (Raiding force consisted of V Corps plus Mott's Division, 3rd Division II Corps and Division of Cavalry). Marched 40 miles south to Jarratt to cut rail link between Petersburg and Wilmington From Nottaway River to Bellfield. On return to siege lines found stragglers and sick members of raiding party who had fallen behind murdered by local civilians along route. Burned houses in retaliation.''
** Winter encampment in the lines before Petersburg until February 4, 1865

1865

* ''William Hobson promoted to Lieutenant Colonel January 18. Retained command 17th Maine.''
* Battle of Hatcher's Run February 5–7 — ''Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel William Hobson<. Attached to Pierce's 2nd Brigade, Mott's/de Trobriand's 3rd Division, Humphreys' II Corps, Meade's Army of Potomac. Advanced and captured enemy entrenchments at Hatcher's run on left wing of Union lines and turned enemy flank February 5. Captured 100 prisoners. Pulled reserve February 6. Sent to left flank again February 7.''
* In entrenchments until March 25
* Appomattox Campaign March 28 – April 9.
** South Side Railroad March 29.
** Boydton Road and White Oak Ridge March 30–31.
** Fall of Petersburg April 2.
** Jettersville April 5. — ''Captured colors of 21st North Carolina and 150 prisoners.''
** Dentonville April 6. — ''Division charged over two miles and captured part of rebel wagon train. Hobson wounded. Captain Green took command. Over 300 prisoners taken. Lost 5 killed, 27 wounded. Noted that one in five officers were wounded and one in ten enlisted wounded during the day.''
** High Bridge April 6–7. — ''Major Charles P Mattocks takes command evening April 6''
** New Store April 8.
** Appomattox Court House April 9. — ''Surrender of Lee and his army.''
* At Burkesville April 11 – May 1.
* March to Washington, D. C., May 1–15.
* Grand Review May 23.
* Mustered out at Bailey's Cross Roads June 4, 1865.
* Recruits transferred to 1st Maine Heavy Artillery.
* Discharged at Portland, Me., June 10, 1865.

Armament

The 17th Maine was an 1862, Army of the Potomac, three-year regiment, that greatly increased the number of men under arms in the federal army. As with many of these volunteers, initially, there were not enough Model 1861 Springfield Rifles to go around so they were instead issued imported British Pattern 1853 rifles. These were the standard rifle for the British army having performed well in the Crimean War. The Enfield was a .577 calibre Minié-type muzzle-loading rifled musket. It was used by both armies and was the second most widely used infantry weapon in the Union forces. The regiment reported the following surveys for the Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville campaigns:

Federicksburg
* A — 64 British Pattern 1853 rifles, (.58 and .577 Cal)
* B — Number unreported, British Pattern 1853 rifles, (.58 and .577 Cal)
* C — 66 British Pattern 1853 rifles, (.58 and .577 Cal)
* D — 68 British Pattern 1853 rifles, (.58 and .577 Cal)
* E — 63 British Pattern 1853 rifles, (.58 and .577 Cal)
* F — 60 British Pattern 1853 rifles, (.58 and .577 Cal)
* G — 63 British Pattern 1853 rifles, (.58 and .577 Cal)
* H — 68 British Pattern 1853 rifles, (.58 and .577 Cal)
* I — 61 British Pattern 1853 rifles, (.58 and .577 Cal)
* K — 59 British Pattern 1853 rifles, (.58 and .577 Cal)
Chancellorsville
* A — 60 British Pattern 1853 rifles, (.58 and .577 Cal)
* B — 53 British Pattern 1853 rifles, (.58 and .577 Cal)
* C — 45 British Pattern 1853 rifles, (.58 and .577 Cal)
* D — 59 British Pattern 1853 rifles, (.58 and .577 Cal)
* E — 53 British Pattern 1853 rifles, (.58 and .577 Cal)
* F — 51 British Pattern 1853 rifles, (.58 and .577 Cal)
* G — 58 British Pattern 1853 rifles, (.58 and .577 Cal)
* H — Number unreported, British Pattern 1853 rifles, (.58 and .577 Cal)
* I — 51 British Pattern 1853 rifles, (.58 and .577 Cal)
* K — 47 British Pattern 1853 rifles, (.58 and .577 Cal)

At Gettysburg, on the evening of July 3, General Birney wanted to standardize the weapons in his division. That evening, he had the 17th and other Enfield-equipped units in his command exchange their arms for the standard muzzle-loading rifled musket of the Union Army, the Springfield Model 1861 Rifled Musket. It fired a .58 inch Minie Ball. and came with a square socket bayonet. They would carry their Springfields until their end of service. They reported the following in survey:

Survey for Fourth Quarter, 31 December 1863
* A — 38 Springfield Rifled Muskets, model 1855, 1861, NA and contract, (.58 Cal.)
* B — 38 Springfield Rifled Muskets, model 1855, 1861, NA and contract, (.58 Cal.); 1 P53 Enfield Rifled Muskets (.58 and .577 Cal.)
* C — 44 Springfield Rifled Muskets, model 1855, 1861, NA and contract, (.58 Cal.); 9 P53 Enfield Rifled Muskets (.58 and .577 Cal.)
* D — 50 Springfield Rifled Muskets, model 1855, 1861, NA and contract, (.58 Cal.)
* E — Number unreported, Springfield Rifled Muskets, model 1855, 1861, NA and contract, (.58 Cal.); 3 P53 Enfield Rifled Muskets (.58 and .577 Cal.)
* F — 38 Springfield Rifled Muskets, model 1855, 1861, NA and contract, (.58 Cal.)
* G — 43 Springfield Rifled Muskets, model 1855, 1861, NA and contract, (.58 Cal.)
* H — 39 Springfield Rifled Muskets, model 1855, 1861, NA and contract, (.58 Cal.)
* I — 35 Springfield Rifled Muskets, model 1855, 1861, NA and contract, (.58 Cal.); 1 P53 Enfield Rifled Muskets (.58 and .577 Cal.)
* K — 47 Springfield Rifled Muskets, model 1855, 1861, NA and contract, (.58 Cal.); 2 P53 Enfield Rifled Muskets (.58 and .577 Cal.)

Casualties and total strength

The 17th Maine enrolled 1,371 men during its existence. It lost 12 officers and 116 enlisted men killed in action or died of wounds received in battle and an additional 4 officers and 159 enlisted men died of disease. 31 men died in Confederate prisons. Total fatalities for the regiment were 370.

See also

* List of Maine Civil War units
* Maine in the American Civil War

Notes/References

Footnotes

Citations

References

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External links

State of Maine Civil War Records Website

Photograph of the 17th Maine Infantry from the Maine Memory Network

Units and formations of the Union Army from Maine, 17th Maine Volunteer Infantry Regiment
1862 establishments in Maine
Military units and formations established in 1862
Military units and formations disestablished in 1865