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First-price Sealed-bid Auction
A first-price sealed-bid auction (FPSBA) is a common type of auction. It is also known as blind auction. In this type of auction, all bidders simultaneously submit sealed bids so that no bidder knows the bid of any other participant. The highest bidder pays the price that was submitted. Strategic analysis In a FPSBA, each bidder is characterized by their monetary valuation of the item for sale. Suppose Alice is a bidder and her valuation is a. Then, if Alice is rational: *She will never bid more than a, because bidding more than a can only make her lose net value. *If she bids exactly a, then she will not lose but also not gain any positive value. *If she bids less than a, then she ''may'' have some positive gain, but the exact gain depends on the bids of the others. Alice would like to bid the smallest amount that can make her win the item, as long as this amount is less than a. For example, if there is another bidder Bob and he bids y and y [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Auction
An auction is usually a process of buying and selling goods or services by offering them up for bids, taking bids, and then selling the item to the highest bidder or buying the item from the lowest bidder. Some exceptions to this definition exist and are described in the section about different types. The branch of economic theory dealing with auction types and participants' behavior in auctions is called auction theory. The open ascending price auction is arguably the most common form of auction and has been used throughout history. Participants bid openly against one another, with each subsequent bid being higher than the previous bid. An auctioneer may announce prices, while bidders submit bids vocally or electronically. Auctions are applied for trade in diverse contexts. These contexts include antiques, paintings, rare collectibles, expensive wines, commodities, livestock, radio spectrum, used cars, real estate, online advertising, vacation packages, emission trading, a ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Revenue Equivalence
Revenue equivalence is a concept in auction theory that states that given certain conditions, any mechanism that results in the same outcomes (i.e. allocates items to the same bidders) also has the same expected revenue. Notation There is a set X of possible outcomes. There are n agents which have different valuations for each outcome. The valuation of agent i (also called its "type") is represented as a function: : v_i : X \longrightarrow R_ which expresses the value it has for each alternative, in monetary terms. The agents have quasilinear utility functions; this means that, if the outcome is x and in addition the agent receives a payment p_i (positive or negative), then the total utility of agent i is: : u_i := v_i(x) + p_i The vector of all value-functions is denoted by v. For every agent i, the vector of all value-functions of the ''other'' agents is denoted by v_. So v \equiv (v_i,v_). A ''mechanism'' is a pair of functions: * An Outcome function, that takes as inpu ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Procurement
Procurement is the method of discovering and agreeing to terms and purchasing goods, Service (economics), services, or other works from an external source, often with the use of a tendering or competitive bidding process. When a government agency buys goods or services through this practice, it is referred to as Government procurement, public procurement. Procurement as an organization, organizational process is intended to ensure that the buyer receives goods, services, or works at the best possible price when aspects such as quality, quantity, time, and location are compared. Corporations and public bodies often define processes intended to promote fair and open competition for their business while minimizing risks such as exposure to fraud and collusion. Almost all purchasing decisions include factors such as delivery and handling, marginal benefit, and fluctuations in the prices of goods. Organisations which have adopted a corporate social responsibility perspective are also ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Tendering
An invitation to tender (ITT, otherwise known as a call for bids or a request for tenders) is a formal, structured procedure for generating competing offers from different potential suppliers or contractors looking to obtain an award of business activity in works, supply, or service contracts, often from companies who have been previously assessed for suitability by means of a supplier questionnaire (SQ) or pre-qualification questionnaire (PQQ). The term "notice inviting tenders" (NIT) is often used in purchasing in India. An ITT differs from a request for quotation (RFQ) or a request for proposal (RFP), in which case other reasons (technology used, quality) might cause or allow choice of the second best offer. An RFP is a request for a price from a buyer but the buyer would also expect suggestions and ideas on how the project work should be done. RFPs are thus focused on more than just pricing/cost, they entail a bit of consulting from the contractor or vendor. The closest equi ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Dutch Auction
A Dutch auction is one of several similar types of auctions for buying or selling goods. Most commonly, it means an auction in which the auctioneer begins with a high asking price in the case of selling, and lowers it until some participant accepts the price, or it reaches a predetermined reserve price. This type of price auction is most commonly used for goods that are required to be sold quickly such as flowers, fresh produce, or tobacco. A Dutch auction has also been called a ''clock auction'' or ''open-outcry descending-price auction''. This type of auction shows the advantage of speed since a sale never requires more than one bid. It is strategically similar to a first-price sealed-bid auction. History Herodotus relates an account of a descending price auction in Babylon, suggesting that market mechanisms similar to Dutch auctions were used in ancient times. Descending-price auctions were used in 17th-century Holland for estate sales and paintings. The Dutch manner of auct ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
English Auction
An English auction is an open-outcry ascending dynamic auction. It proceeds as follows. * The auctioneer opens the auction by announcing a suggested opening bid, a starting price or reserve for the item on sale. * Then the auctioneer accepts increasingly higher bids from the floor and sometimes from other sources, for example online or telephone bids, consisting of buyers with an interest in the item. The auctioneer usually determines the minimum increment of bids, often making them larger as bidding reaches higher levels. * The highest bidder at any given moment is considered to have the standing bid, which can only be displaced by a higher bid from a competing buyer. * If no competing bidder challenges the standing bid within the time allowed by the auctioneer, the standing bid becomes the winner, and the item is sold to the highest bidder at a price equal to their bid. *If no bidder accepts the starting price, the auctioneer either begins to lower the starting price in increme ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Common Value Auction
In common value auctions the value of the item for sale is identical amongst bidders, but bidders have different information about the item's value. This stands in contrast to a private value auction where each bidder's private valuation of the item is different and independent of peers' valuations. A classic example of a pure common values auction is when a jar full of quarters is auctioned off. The jar will be worth the same amount to anyone. However, each bidder has a different guess about how many quarters are in the jar. Other, real-life examples include Treasury bill auctions, initial public offerings, spectrum auctions, very prized paintings, art pieces, antiques etc. One important phenomenon occurring in common value auctions is the winner's curse. Bidders have only estimates of the value of the good. If, on average, bidders are estimating correctly, the highest bid will tend to have been placed by someone who overestimated the good's value. This is an example of adverse s ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Statistically Independent
Independence is a fundamental notion in probability theory, as in statistics and the theory of stochastic processes. Two events are independent, statistically independent, or stochastically independent if, informally speaking, the occurrence of one does not affect the probability of occurrence of the other or, equivalently, does not affect the odds. Similarly, two random variables are independent if the realization of one does not affect the probability distribution of the other. When dealing with collections of more than two events, two notions of independence need to be distinguished. The events are called pairwise independent if any two events in the collection are independent of each other, while mutual independence (or collective independence) of events means, informally speaking, that each event is independent of any combination of other events in the collection. A similar notion exists for collections of random variables. Mutual independence implies pairwise independence, ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Truthful Mechanism
In game theory, an asymmetric game where players have private information is said to be strategy-proof or strategyproof (SP) if it is a weakly-dominant strategy for every player to reveal his/her private information, i.e. given no information about what the others do, you fare best or at least not worse by being truthful. SP is also called truthful or dominant-strategy-incentive-compatible (DSIC), to distinguish it from other kinds of incentive compatibility. An SP game is not always immune to collusion, but its robust variants are; with group strategyproofness no group of people can collude to misreport their preferences in a way that makes every member better off, and with strong group strategyproofness no group of people can collude to misreport their preferences in a way that makes at least one member of the group better off without making any of the remaining members worse off. Examples Typical examples of SP mechanisms are majority voting between two alternatives, second- ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Bayesian Game
In game theory, a Bayesian game is a game that models the outcome of player interactions using aspects of Bayesian probability. Bayesian games are notable because they allowed, for the first time in game theory, for the specification of the solutions to games with incomplete information. Hungarian economist John C. Harsanyi introduced the concept of Bayesian games in three papers from 1967 and 1968: He was awarded the Nobel Prize for these and other contributions to game theory in 1994. Roughly speaking, Harsanyi defined Bayesian games in the following way: players are assigned by nature at the start of the game a set of characteristics. By mapping probability distributions to these characteristics and by calculating the outcome of the game using Bayesian probability, the result is a game whose solution is, for technical reasons, far easier to calculate than a similar game in a non-Bayesian context. For those technical reasons, see the Specification of games section in this article ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Dominant Strategy
In game theory, strategic dominance (commonly called simply dominance) occurs when one strategy is better than another strategy for one player, no matter how that player's opponents may play. Many simple games can be solved using dominance. The opposite, intransitivity, occurs in games where one strategy may be better or worse than another strategy for one player, depending on how the player's opponents may play. Terminology When a player tries to choose the "best" strategy among a multitude of options, that player may compare two strategies A and B to see which one is better. The result of the comparison is one of: * B is equivalent to A: choosing B always gives the same outcome as choosing A, no matter what the other players do. * B strictly dominates A: choosing B always gives a better outcome than choosing A, no matter what the other players do. * B weakly dominates A: choosing B always gives at least as good an outcome as choosing A, no matter what the other players do, an ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Second-price Auction
A Vickrey auction or sealed-bid second-price auction (SBSPA) is a type of sealed-bid auction. Bidders submit written bids without knowing the bid of the other people in the auction. The highest bidder wins but the price paid is the second-highest bid. This type of auction is strategically similar to an English auction and gives bidders an incentive to bid their true value. The auction was first described academically by Columbia University professor William Vickrey in 1961 though it had been used by stamp collectors since 1893. In 1797 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe sold a manuscript using a sealed-bid, second-price auction. Vickrey's original paper mainly considered auctions where only a single, indivisible good is being sold. The terms ''Vickrey auction'' and ''second-price sealed-bid auction'' are, in this case only, equivalent and used interchangeably. In the case of multiple identical goods, the bidders submit inverse demand curves and pay the opportunity cost. Vickrey auctions ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
