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Minimal Logic
Minimal logic, or minimal calculus, is a symbolic logic system originally developed by Ingebrigt Johansson. It is an intuitionistic and paraconsistent logic, that rejects both the law of the excluded middle as well as the principle of explosion (''ex falso quodlibet''), and therefore holding neither of the following two derivations as valid: :\vdash (B \lor \neg B) :(A \land \neg A) \vdash where A and B are any propositions. Most constructive logics only reject the former, the law of excluded middle. In classical logic, the ''ex falso'' laws :(A \land \neg A) \to B, :\neg(A \lor \neg A) \to B, :\neg A \to (A \to B), as well as their variants with A and \neg A switched, are equivalent to each other and valid. Minimal logic also rejects those principles. Axiomatization Minimal logic is axiomatized over the positive fragment of intuitionistic logic. These logics may be formulated in the language using implication \to, conjunction \land and disjunction \lor as the basic c ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Mathematical Logic
Mathematical logic is the study of logic, formal logic within mathematics. Major subareas include model theory, proof theory, set theory, and recursion theory. Research in mathematical logic commonly addresses the mathematical properties of formal systems of logic such as their expressive or deductive power. However, it can also include uses of logic to characterize correct mathematical reasoning or to establish foundations of mathematics. Since its inception, mathematical logic has both contributed to and been motivated by the study of foundations of mathematics. This study began in the late 19th century with the development of axiomatic frameworks for geometry, arithmetic, and Mathematical analysis, analysis. In the early 20th century it was shaped by David Hilbert's Hilbert's program, program to prove the consistency of foundational theories. Results of Kurt Gödel, Gerhard Gentzen, and others provided partial resolution to the program, and clarified the issues involved in pr ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Relevance Logic
Relevance logic, also called relevant logic, is a kind of non-classical logic requiring the antecedent and consequent of implications to be relevantly related. They may be viewed as a family of substructural or modal logics. It is generally, but not universally, called ''relevant logic'' by British and, especially, Australian logicians, and ''relevance logic'' by American logicians. Relevance logic aims to capture aspects of implication that are ignored by the " material implication" operator in classical truth-functional logic, namely the notion of relevance between antecedent and conditional of a true implication. This idea is not new: C. I. Lewis was led to invent modal logic, and specifically strict implication, on the grounds that classical logic grants paradoxes of material implication such as the principle that a falsehood implies any proposition. Hence "if I'm a donkey, then two and two is four" is true when translated as a material implication, yet it seems intuitiv ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Natural Deduction
In logic and proof theory, natural deduction is a kind of proof calculus in which logical reasoning is expressed by inference rules closely related to the "natural" way of reasoning. This contrasts with Hilbert-style systems, which instead use axioms as much as possible to express the logical laws of deductive reasoning. Motivation Natural deduction grew out of a context of dissatisfaction with the axiomatizations of deductive reasoning common to the systems of Hilbert, Frege, and Russell (see, e.g., Hilbert system). Such axiomatizations were most famously used by Russell and Whitehead in their mathematical treatise ''Principia Mathematica''. Spurred on by a series of seminars in Poland in 1926 by Łukasiewicz that advocated a more natural treatment of logic, Jaśkowski made the earliest attempts at defining a more natural deduction, first in 1929 using a diagrammatic notation, and later updating his proposal in a sequence of papers in 1934 and 1935. His proposals led to diffe ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Markov's Principle
Markov's principle, named after Andrey Markov Jr, is a conditional existence statement for which there are many equivalent formulations, as discussed below. The principle is logically valid classically, but not in intuitionistic constructive mathematics. However, many particular instances of it are nevertheless provable in a constructive context as well. History The principle was first studied and adopted by the Russian school of constructivism, together with choice principles and often with a realizability perspective on the notion of mathematical function. In computability theory In the language of computability theory, Markov's principle is a formal expression of the claim that if it is impossible that an algorithm does not terminate, then for some input it does terminate. This is equivalent to the claim that if a set and its complement are both computably enumerable, then the set is decidable. In intuitionistic logic In predicate logic, a predicate ''P'' over some ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Heyting Arithmetic
In mathematical logic, Heyting arithmetic is an axiomatization of arithmetic in accordance with the philosophy of intuitionism.Troelstra 1973:18 It is named after Arend Heyting, who first proposed it. Axiomatization As with first-order Peano arithmetic , the intended model of this theory are the natural numbers and the theories characterize addition and multiplication. Heyting arithmetic adopts the axioms of Peano arithmetic, including the signature with zero "0" and the successor "S", but uses intuitionistic logic for inference. In particular, the principle of the excluded middle does not hold in general. Metalogic and theorems As with other theories over intuitionistic logic, various instances of can be proven. For instance, proves equality "=" is decidable for all numbers, :\vdash \forall n. \forall m. \big((n = m)\lor\neg(n = m)\big) In fact, since equality is the only predicate symbol in Heyting arithmetic, it then follows that, for any quantifier-free formula \phi, w ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Double-negation Translation
In proof theory, a discipline within mathematical logic, double-negation translation, sometimes called negative translation, is a general approach for embedding classical logic into intuitionistic logic, typically by translating formulas to formulas which are classically equivalent but intuitionistically inequivalent. Particular instances of double-negation translation include Glivenko's translation for propositional logic, and the Gödel–Gentzen translation and Kuroda's translation for first-order logic. Propositional logic The easiest double-negation translation to describe comes from Glivenko's theorem, proved by Valery Glivenko in 1929. It maps each classical formula φ to its double negation ¬¬φ. Glivenko's theorem states: :If φ is a propositional formula, then φ is a classical tautology if and only if ¬¬φ is an intuitionistic tautology. Glivenko's theorem implies the more general statement: :If ''T'' is a set of propositional formulas and φ a propositional formu ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Intuitionistic Logic
Intuitionistic logic, sometimes more generally called constructive logic, refers to systems of symbolic logic that differ from the systems used for classical logic by more closely mirroring the notion of constructive proof. In particular, systems of intuitionistic logic do not assume the law of the excluded middle and double negation elimination, which are fundamental inference rules in classical logic. Formalized intuitionistic logic was originally developed by Arend Heyting to provide a formal basis for L. E. J. Brouwer's programme of intuitionism. From a proof-theoretic perspective, Heyting’s calculus is a restriction of classical logic in which the law of excluded middle and double negation elimination have been removed. Excluded middle and double negation elimination can still be proved for some propositions on a case by case basis, however, but do not hold universally as they do with classical logic. The standard explanation of intuitionistic logic is the BHK interpretati ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Intermediate Logic
In mathematical logic, a superintuitionistic logic is a propositional logic extending intuitionistic logic. Classical logic is the strongest consistent superintuitionistic logic; thus, consistent superintuitionistic logics are called intermediate logics (the logics are intermediate between intuitionistic logic and classical logic). Definition A superintuitionistic logic is a set ''L'' of propositional formulas in a countable set of variables ''p''''i'' satisfying the following properties: :1. all axioms of intuitionistic logic belong to ''L''; :2. if ''F'' and ''G'' are formulas such that ''F'' and ''F'' → ''G'' both belong to ''L'', then ''G'' also belongs to ''L'' (closure under modus ponens); :3. if ''F''(''p''1, ''p''2, ..., ''p''''n'') is a formula of ''L'', and ''G''1, ''G''2, ..., ''G''''n'' are any formulas, then ''F''(''G''1, ''G''2, ..., ''G''''n'') belongs to ''L'' (closure under substitution). Such a logic is intermediate if furthermore :4. ''L'' is not the set of all ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Classical Logic
Classical logic (or standard logic or Frege-Russell logic) is the intensively studied and most widely used class of deductive logic. Classical logic has had much influence on analytic philosophy. Characteristics Each logical system in this class shares characteristic properties: Gabbay, Dov, (1994). 'Classical vs non-classical logic'. In D.M. Gabbay, C.J. Hogger, and J.A. Robinson, (Eds), ''Handbook of Logic in Artificial Intelligence and Logic Programming'', volume 2, chapter 2.6. Oxford University Press. # Law of excluded middle and double negation elimination # Law of noncontradiction, and the principle of explosion # Monotonicity of entailment and idempotency of entailment # Commutativity of conjunction # De Morgan duality: every logical operator is dual to another While not entailed by the preceding conditions, contemporary discussions of classical logic normally only include propositional and first-order logics. Shapiro, Stewart (2000). Classical Logic. In Stanford Encyclop ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Double Negation
In propositional logic, double negation is the theorem that states that "If a statement is true, then it is not the case that the statement is not true." This is expressed by saying that a proposition ''A'' is logically equivalent to ''not (not-A''), or by the formula A ≡ ~(~A) where the sign ≡ expresses logical equivalence and the sign ~ expresses negation. Like the law of the excluded middle, this principle is considered to be a law of thought in classical logic, but it is disallowed by intuitionistic logic. The principle was stated as a theorem of propositional logic by Russell and Whitehead in ''Principia Mathematica'' as: :: \mathbf. \ \ \vdash.\ p \ \equiv \ \thicksim(\thicksim p)PM 1952 reprint of 2nd edition 1927 pp. 101–02, 117. ::"This is the principle of double negation, ''i.e.'' a proposition is equivalent of the falsehood of its negation." Elimination and introduction Double negation elimination and double negation introduction are two valid rules of ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
De Morgan's Laws
In propositional logic and Boolean algebra, De Morgan's laws, also known as De Morgan's theorem, are a pair of transformation rules that are both valid rules of inference. They are named after Augustus De Morgan, a 19th-century British mathematician. The rules allow the expression of conjunctions and disjunctions purely in terms of each other via negation. The rules can be expressed in English as: * The negation of a disjunction is the conjunction of the negations * The negation of a conjunction is the disjunction of the negations or * The complement of the union of two sets is the same as the intersection of their complements * The complement of the intersection of two sets is the same as the union of their complements or * not (A or B) = (not A) and (not B) * not (A and B) = (not A) or (not B) where "A or B" is an "inclusive or" meaning ''at least'' one of A or B rather than an "exclusive or" that means ''exactly'' one of A or B. In set theory and Boolean algebra, these ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Intuitionistic Logic
Intuitionistic logic, sometimes more generally called constructive logic, refers to systems of symbolic logic that differ from the systems used for classical logic by more closely mirroring the notion of constructive proof. In particular, systems of intuitionistic logic do not assume the law of the excluded middle and double negation elimination, which are fundamental inference rules in classical logic. Formalized intuitionistic logic was originally developed by Arend Heyting to provide a formal basis for L. E. J. Brouwer's programme of intuitionism. From a proof-theoretic perspective, Heyting’s calculus is a restriction of classical logic in which the law of excluded middle and double negation elimination have been removed. Excluded middle and double negation elimination can still be proved for some propositions on a case by case basis, however, but do not hold universally as they do with classical logic. The standard explanation of intuitionistic logic is the BHK interpretati ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
