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Langford–Moore Paradox
The paradox of analysis (or Langford–Moore paradox) is a paradox that concerns how an analysis can be both correct and informative. The problem was formulated by philosopher G. E. Moore in his book ''Principia Ethica'', and first named by C. H. Langford in his article "The Notion of Analysis in Moore's Philosophy" (in ''The Philosophy of G. E. Moore'', edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, Northwestern University, 1942, pp. 319–342). The paradox A conceptual analysis is something like the definition of a word. However, unlike a standard dictionary definition (which may list examples or talk about related terms as well), a completely correct analysis of a concept in terms of others seems like it should have exactly the same meaning as the original concept. Thus, in order to be correct, the analysis should be able to be used in any context where the original concept is used, without changing the meaning of the discussion in context. Conceptual analyses of this sort are a major goa ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Analysis
Analysis (: analyses) is the process of breaking a complex topic or substance into smaller parts in order to gain a better understanding of it. The technique has been applied in the study of mathematics and logic since before Aristotle (384–322 BC), though ''analysis'' as a formal concept is a relatively recent development. The word comes from the Ancient Greek (''analysis'', "a breaking-up" or "an untying" from ''ana-'' "up, throughout" and ''lysis'' "a loosening"). From it also comes the word's plural, ''analyses''. As a formal concept, the method has variously been ascribed to René Descartes ('' Discourse on the Method''), and Galileo Galilei. It has also been ascribed to Isaac Newton, in the form of a practical method of physical discovery (which he did not name). The converse of analysis is synthesis: putting the pieces back together again in a new or different whole. Science and technology Chemistry The field of chemistry uses analysis in three ways: to i ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Analytic–synthetic Distinction
The analytic–synthetic distinction is a semantic distinction used primarily in philosophy to distinguish between propositions (in particular, statements that are affirmative subject– predicate judgments) that are of two types: analytic propositions and synthetic propositions. Analytic propositions are true or not true solely by virtue of their meaning, whereas synthetic propositions' truth, if any, derives from how their meaning relates to the world. While the distinction was first proposed by Immanuel Kant, it was revised considerably over time, and different philosophers have used the terms in very different ways. Furthermore, some philosophers (starting with Willard Van Orman Quine) have questioned whether there is even a clear distinction to be made between propositions which are analytically true and propositions which are synthetically true. Debates regarding the nature and usefulness of the distinction continue to this day in contemporary philosophy of language. Kant ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Definition
A definition is a statement of the meaning of a term (a word, phrase, or other set of symbols). Definitions can be classified into two large categories: intensional definitions (which try to give the sense of a term), and extensional definitions (which try to list the objects that a term describes).Lyons, John. "Semantics, vol. I." Cambridge: Cambridge (1977). p.158 and on. Another important category of definitions is the class of ostensive definitions, which convey the meaning of a term by pointing out examples. A term may have many different senses and multiple meanings, and thus require multiple definitions. In mathematics, a definition is used to give a precise meaning to a new term, by describing a condition which unambiguously qualifies what the mathematical term is and is not. Definitions and axioms form the basis on which all of modern mathematics is to be constructed. Basic terminology In modern usage, a definition is something, typically expressed in words, that at ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Analysis
Analysis (: analyses) is the process of breaking a complex topic or substance into smaller parts in order to gain a better understanding of it. The technique has been applied in the study of mathematics and logic since before Aristotle (384–322 BC), though ''analysis'' as a formal concept is a relatively recent development. The word comes from the Ancient Greek (''analysis'', "a breaking-up" or "an untying" from ''ana-'' "up, throughout" and ''lysis'' "a loosening"). From it also comes the word's plural, ''analyses''. As a formal concept, the method has variously been ascribed to René Descartes ('' Discourse on the Method''), and Galileo Galilei. It has also been ascribed to Isaac Newton, in the form of a practical method of physical discovery (which he did not name). The converse of analysis is synthesis: putting the pieces back together again in a new or different whole. Science and technology Chemistry The field of chemistry uses analysis in three ways: to i ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Sense And Reference
In the philosophy of language, the distinction between sense and reference was an idea of the German philosopher and mathematician Gottlob Frege in 1892 (in his paper "On Sense and Reference"; German: "Über Sinn und Bedeutung"), reflecting the two ways he believed a singular term may have meaning. The reference (or "referent"; ''Bedeutung'') of a ''proper name'' is the object it means or indicates (''bedeuten''), whereas its sense (''Sinn'') is what the name expresses. The reference of a ''sentence'' is its truth value, whereas its sense is the thought that it expresses."On Sense and Reference" Über Sinn und Bedeutung" '' Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik'', vol. 100 (1892), pp. 25–50, esp. p. 31. Frege justified the distinction in a number of ways. #Sense is something possessed by a name, whether or not it has a reference. For example, the name "Odysseus" is intelligible, and therefore has a sense, even though there is no individual object (its refer ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
