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Economy Of Force
Economy of force is one of the nine Principles of War, based upon Carl von Clausewitz's approach to warfare. It is the principle of employing all available combat power in the most effective way possible, in an attempt to allocate a minimum of essential combat power to any secondary efforts. It is the judicious employment and distribution of forces towards the primary objective of any person's conflict. Economy of force is the reciprocal of mass. No part of a force should ever be left without purpose. The allocation of available combat power to such tasks, like limited attacks, defense, delays, deception or even retrograde operations is measured, in order to achieve mass at decisive points elsewhere on the battlefield. Carl von Clausewitz once said that "Every unnecessary expenditure of time, every unnecessary detour, is a waste of power, and therefore contrary to the principles of strategy." The Principles of War are a part of United States Army doctrine. The current doctrinal ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Carl Von Clausewitz
Carl Philipp Gottfried (or Gottlieb) von Clausewitz (; 1 June 1780 – 16 November 1831) was a Prussian general and military theorist who stressed the "moral", in modern terms meaning psychological, and political aspects of waging war. His most notable work, (''"On War''"), though unfinished at his death, is considered a seminal treatise on military strategy. Clausewitz was a realist in many different senses, including realpolitik, and while in some respects a romantic, he also drew heavily on the rationalist ideas of the European Enlightenment. Clausewitz's thinking is often described as Hegelian because of his dialectical method; but, although he was probably personally acquainted with Hegel, there remains debate about whether Clausewitz was influenced by him.Cormier, Youri. War As Paradox: Clausewitz & Hegel on Fighting Doctrines and Ethics, (Montreal & Kingston: McGill Queen's University Press, 2016) http://www.mqup.ca/war-as-paradox-products-9780773547698.php He stres ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Force Concentration
Force concentration is the practice of concentrating a military force so as to bring to bear such overwhelming force against a portion of an enemy force that the disparity between the two forces alone acts as a force multiplier in favour of the concentrated forces. Mass of decision Force concentration became integral to the Prussian military operational doctrine of the ''mass of decision'', which aimed to cause disproportionate losses on the enemy and therefore destroy the enemy's ability to fight. From an empirical examination of past battles, the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831) concluded: ..we may infer, that it is very difficult in the present state of Europe, for the most talented General to gain a victory over an enemy double his strength. Now if we see double numbers prove such a weight in the scale against the greatest Generals, we may be sure, that in ordinary cases, in small as well as great combats, an important superiority of numbers ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
United States Army
The United States Army (USA) is the land service branch of the United States Armed Forces. It is one of the eight U.S. uniformed services, and is designated as the Army of the United States in the U.S. Constitution.Article II, section 2, clause 1 of the United States Constitution (1789). See alsTitle 10, Subtitle B, Chapter 301, Section 3001 The oldest and most senior branch of the U.S. military in order of precedence, the modern U.S. Army has its roots in the Continental Army, which was formed 14 June 1775 to fight the American Revolutionary War (1775–1783)—before the United States was established as a country. After the Revolutionary War, the Congress of the Confederation created the United States Army on 3 June 1784 to replace the disbanded Continental Army.Library of CongressJournals of the Continental Congress, Volume 27/ref> The United States Army considers itself to be a continuation of the Continental Army, and thus considers its institutional inception to be th ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
List Of United States Army Field Manuals
This list of United States Army Field Manuals contains information about a variety of Field Manuals. Abbreviations and Keys * ADP # means Army Doctrine Publication No. #; * FM # means Field Manual No. #; * DA means Department of the Army; * GPO means Government Publishing Office; * HQ, DA means Headquarters, Department of the Army; * WD means War Department. Two capstones ADP 1 and ADP 3–0 are the ''two capstones'' of U.S. Army's field manuals. ADP 1 (FM 1, FM 100–1) ADP 3–0 (FM 3–0, FM 100–5, Field Service Regulations) : i. FSR is equals to Field Service Regulations. : ii. Detached edition is not known. See also United States Army Field Manuals United States Army Field Manuals are published by the United States Army's Army Publishing Directorate. As of 27 July 2007, some 542 field manuals were in use. They contain detailed information and how-tos for procedures important to soldiers ser ... ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
On War
''Vom Kriege'' () is a book on war and military strategy by Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831), written mostly after the Napoleonic wars, between 1816 and 1830, and published posthumously by his wife Marie von Brühl in 1832. It is one of the most important treatises on political-military analysis and strategy ever written, and remains both controversial and influential on strategic thinking. ''Vom Kriege'' has been translated into English several times as ''On War''. ''On War'' is an unfinished work. Clausewitz had set about revising his accumulated manuscripts in 1827, but did not live to finish the task. His wife edited his collected works and published them between 1832 and 1835. His ten-volume collected works contain most of his larger historical and theoretical writings, though not his shorter articles and papers or his extensive correspondence with important political, military, intellectual and cultural leaders in the Prussian state. ''On War'' is forme ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
John Boyd (military Strategist)
John Richard Boyd (January 23, 1927 – March 9, 1997) was a United States Air Force fighter pilot and Pentagon consultant during the second half of the 20th century. His theories have been highly influential in military, business, and litigation strategies and planning. As part of the Fighter Mafia, Boyd inspired the Lightweight Fighter program (LWF), which produced the General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcon and preceded McDonnell Douglas F/A-18 Hornet. Boyd, together with Thomas Christie, created the Energy–Maneuverability theory of aerial combat, which became the world standard for the design of fighter aircraft. He also developed the decision cycle known as the OODA loop, the process by which an entity reacts to an event. Early life Boyd was born on January 23, 1927, in Erie, Pennsylvania. He enlisted in the Army Air Forces on October 30, 1944, while he was still a junior in high school. After graduation, he completed his basic training and skill training as an aircraft ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
OODA Loop
The OODA loop is the cycle ''observe–orient–decide–act'', developed by military strategist and United States Air Force Colonel John Boyd. Boyd applied the concept to the combat operations process, often at the operational level during military campaigns. It is now also often applied to understand commercial operations and learning processes. The approach explains how agility can overcome raw power in dealing with human opponents. It is especially applicable to cyber security and cyberwarfare. The OODA loop has become an important concept in litigation, business, law enforcement, management education, and military strategy. According to Boyd, decision-making occurs in a recurring cycle of observe–orient–decide–act. An entity (whether an individual or an organization) that can process this cycle quickly, observing and reacting to unfolding events more rapidly than an opponent, can thereby "get inside" the opponent's decision cycle and gain the advantage. See also ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
