|
Bertrand's Box Paradox
Bertrand's box paradox is a Paradox#Quine's_classification, veridical paradox in elementary probability theory. It was first posed by Joseph Bertrand in his 1889 work Calcul des Probabilités'. There are three boxes: # a box containing two gold coins, # a box containing two silver coins, # a box containing one gold coin and one silver coin. A coin withdrawn at random from one of the three boxes happens to be a gold. What is the probability the other coin from the same box will also be a gold coin? A veridical paradox is a paradox whose correct solution seems to be counterintuitive. It may seem intuitive that the probability that the remaining coin is gold should be , but the probability is actually . Bertrand showed that if were correct, it would result in a contradiction, so cannot be correct. This simple but counterintuitive puzzle is used as a standard example in teaching probability theory. The solution illustrates some basic principles, including the Kolmogorov axioms. ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Three Mystery Boxes
3 (three) is a number, numeral and digit. It is the natural number following 2 and preceding 4, and is the smallest odd prime number and the only prime preceding a square number. It has religious and cultural significance in many societies. Evolution of the Arabic digit The use of three lines to denote the number 3 occurred in many writing systems, including some (like Roman and Chinese numerals) that are still in use. That was also the original representation of 3 in the Brahmic (Indian) numerical notation, its earliest forms aligned vertically. However, during the Gupta Empire the sign was modified by the addition of a curve on each line. The Nāgarī script rotated the lines clockwise, so they appeared horizontally, and ended each line with a short downward stroke on the right. In cursive script, the three strokes were eventually connected to form a glyph resembling a with an additional stroke at the bottom: ३. The Indian digits spread to the Caliphate in the 9th c ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Paradox
A paradox is a logically self-contradictory statement or a statement that runs contrary to one's expectation. It is a statement that, despite apparently valid reasoning from true or apparently true premises, leads to a seemingly self-contradictory or a logically unacceptable conclusion. A paradox usually involves contradictory-yet-interrelated elements that exist simultaneously and persist over time. They result in "persistent contradiction between interdependent elements" leading to a lasting "unity of opposites". In logic, many paradoxes exist that are known to be invalid arguments, yet are nevertheless valuable in promoting critical thinking, while other paradoxes have revealed errors in definitions that were assumed to be rigorous, and have caused axioms of mathematics and logic to be re-examined. One example is Russell's paradox, which questions whether a "list of all lists that do not contain themselves" would include itself and showed that attempts to found set theory on ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Probability Theory
Probability theory or probability calculus is the branch of mathematics concerned with probability. Although there are several different probability interpretations, probability theory treats the concept in a rigorous mathematical manner by expressing it through a set of axioms of probability, axioms. Typically these axioms formalise probability in terms of a probability space, which assigns a measure (mathematics), measure taking values between 0 and 1, termed the probability measure, to a set of outcomes called the sample space. Any specified subset of the sample space is called an event (probability theory), event. Central subjects in probability theory include discrete and continuous random variables, probability distributions, and stochastic processes (which provide mathematical abstractions of determinism, non-deterministic or uncertain processes or measured Quantity, quantities that may either be single occurrences or evolve over time in a random fashion). Although it is no ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Joseph Bertrand
Joseph Louis François Bertrand (; 11 March 1822 – 5 April 1900) was a French mathematician whose work emphasized number theory, differential geometry, probability theory, economics and thermodynamics. Biography Joseph Bertrand was the son of physician Alexandre Jacques François Bertrand and the brother of archaeologist Alexandre Bertrand. His father died when Joseph was only nine years old; by that time he had learned a substantial amount of mathematics and could speak Latin fluently. At eleven years old he attended the course of the École Polytechnique as an auditor. From age eleven to seventeen, he obtained two bachelor's degrees, a license and a PhD with a thesis concerning the mathematical theory of electricity, and was admitted to the 1839 entrance examination of the École Polytechnique. Bertrand was a professor at the École Polytechnique and Collège de France, and was a member of the Paris Academy of Sciences of which he was the permanent secretary for twenty-si ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Kolmogorov Axioms
The standard probability axioms are the foundations of probability theory introduced by Russian mathematician Andrey Kolmogorov in 1933. These axioms remain central and have direct contributions to mathematics, the physical sciences, and real-world probability cases. There are several other (equivalent) approaches to formalising probability. Bayesians will often motivate the Kolmogorov axioms by invoking Cox's theorem or the Dutch book arguments instead. Kolmogorov axioms The assumptions as to setting up the axioms can be summarised as follows: Let (\Omega, F, P) be a measure space such that P(E) is the probability of some event E, and P(\Omega) = 1. Then (\Omega, F, P) is a probability space, with sample space \Omega, event space F and probability measure P. First axiom The probability of an event is a non-negative real number: :P(E)\in\mathbb, P(E)\geq 0 \qquad \forall E \in F where F is the event space. It follows (when combined with the second axiom) that P(E) is alwa ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Boy Or Girl Paradox
The Boy or Girl paradox surrounds a set of questions in probability theory, which are also known as The Two Child Problem, Mr. Smith's Children and the Mrs. Smith Problem. The initial formulation of the question dates back to at least 1959, when Martin Gardner featured it in his October 1959 " Mathematical Games column" in ''Scientific American''. He titled it The Two Children Problem, and phrased the paradox as follows: *Mr. Jones has two children. The older child is a girl. What is the probability that both children are girls? *Mr. Smith has two children. At least one of them is a boy. What is the probability that both children are boys? Gardner initially gave the answers and , respectively, but later acknowledged that the second question was ambiguous. Its answer could be , depending on the procedure by which the information "at least one of them is a boy" was obtained. The ambiguity, depending on the exact wording and possible assumptions, was confirmed by Maya Bar-H ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Monty Hall Problem
The Monty Hall problem is a brain teaser, in the form of a probability puzzle, based nominally on the American television game show ''Let's Make a Deal'' and named after its original host, Monty Hall. The problem was originally posed (and solved) in a letter by Steve Selvin to the ''The American Statistician, American Statistician'' in 1975. It became famous as a question from reader Craig F. Whitaker's letter quoted in Marilyn vos Savant's "Ask Marilyn" column in ''Parade (magazine), Parade'' magazine in 1990: Savant's response was that the contestant should switch to the other door. By the standard assumptions, the switching strategy has a probability of winning the car, while the strategy of keeping the initial choice has only a probability. When the player first makes their choice, there is a chance that the car is behind one of the doors not chosen. This probability does not change after the host reveals a goat behind one of the unchosen doors. When the host provides i ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Two Envelopes Problem
The two envelopes problem, also known as the exchange paradox, is a paradox in probability theory. It is of special interest in decision theory and for the Bayesian interpretation of probability theory. It is a variant of an older problem known as the necktie paradox. The problem is typically introduced by formulating a hypothetical challenge like the following example: Since the situation is symmetric, it seems obvious that there is no point in switching envelopes. On the other hand, a simple calculation using expected values suggests the opposite conclusion, that it is always beneficial to swap envelopes, since the person stands to gain twice as much money if they switch, while the only risk is halving what they currently have. Introduction Problem A person is given two indistinguishable envelopes, each of which contains a sum of money. One envelope contains twice as much as the other. The person may pick one envelope and keep whatever amount it contains. They pick one env ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Sleeping Beauty Problem
The Sleeping Beauty problem, also known as the Sleeping Beauty paradox, is a puzzle in decision theory in which an ideally rational Epistemology, epistemic agent is told she will be awoken from sleep either once or twice according to the toss of a coin. Each time she will have no memory of whether she has been awoken before, and is asked what her degree of belief that “the outcome of the coin toss is Heads” ought to be when she is first awakened. History The problem was originally formulated in unpublished work in the mid-1980s by Arnold Zuboff (the work was later published as "One Self: The Logic of Experience") followed by a paper by Adam Elga. A formal analysis of the problem of belief formation in decision problems with imperfect recall was provided first by Michele Piccione and Ariel Rubinstein in their paper: "On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall" where the "paradox of the absent minded driver" was first introduced and the Sleeping Beauty pr ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
